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Abstract 
Although the analogy between macroscopic machines and biological molecular devices 
plays an important role in the conceptual framework of both neo-mechanistic accounts 
and nanotechnology, it has recently been claimed that certain complex molecular 
devices (consisting of biological or synthetic macromolecular aggregates) cannot be 
considered machines since they are subject to physicochemical forces that are different 
from those of macroscopic machines. However, the structural and physicochemical 
conditions that allow both macroscopic machines and microscopic devices to work and 
perform new functions, through a combination of elemental functional parts, have not 
yet been examined. In order to fill this void, this paper has a threefold aim: first, to 
clarify the structural and organisational conditions of macroscopic machines and 
microscopic devices; second, to determine whether the machine-like analogy fits 
nanoscale devices; and third, to assess whether the machine-like analogy is appropriate 
for describing the behaviour of some biological macromolecules. Finally, the paper 
gives an account of ‘machine’ which, while acknowledging the physicochemical and 
organisational differences between man-made machines and biological microscopic 
devices, nevertheless identifies a common conceptual core that allows us to consider the 
latter ‘machines’. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last 25 years, the concept of ‘machine-like system’ has been extensively 
employed in the neo-mechanistic framework to describe biological mechanisms, since 
said mechanisms have been regarded as the functional components of a system which 
behaves like a machine. Moreover, the analogy between machines and certain biological 
macromolecular structures plays a key role in nanotechnology, with some kinds of 
macromolecules being artificially reproduced by considering them machine-like 
systems. 
Neo-mechanistic accounts have so far focused on the epistemological aspect of 
mechanistic explanations in the life sciences, with a rough analogy often being drawn 
between (biological) mechanisms and machines. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Moore 
(2012), Skillings (2015) and Nicholson (2013), there are some relevant differences 
(mainly due to different size scales) in the physicochemical behaviour of macroscopic 
machines, on the one hand, and microscopic devices, on the other, that make this 
analogy rather dangerous. As a result, these authors have argued that the analogy 
between macroscopic machines and microscopic devices (such as synthetic nano-
machines or certain biological macromolecules) should be taken with a grain of salt and, 
in most cases, completely dismissed. Yet the issue is far from simple, since the 
conceptual framework of contemporary nanotechnology is based on the idea that some 
biological macromolecules are indeed machines, and can therefore be artificially 
reproduced using a bottom-up approach, according to which a supramolecular structure 
may be built by assembling smaller molecular components. 
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No comprehensive ontological analysis of the concept of machine and, particularly, 
the status of machine of certain kinds of microscopic devices (synthetic as well as 
biological) has yet been carried out by either neo-mechanistic accounts or the 
philosophy of (nano)technology. In an attempt to fill this void, this paper aims to 
establish the conceptual boundaries of the concept ‘machine’ and to understand to what 
extent some molecular devices may be defined as such. It is worth stressing that this 
paper is not aimed at claiming that organisms are machines, but rather at evaluating 
whether or not molecular synthetic devices and some biological macromolecular 
structures share common properties that make all of them ʻmachinesʼ. In order to 
understand whether or some molecular devices are machines, it will be necessary to 
analyse the structural and physicochemical conditions of not only nanoscale devices, 
but also macroscopic machines, since the term ‘machine’ was originally coined to refer 
to macroscopic man-made devices (e.g. Archimedean simple machines), and only later, 
during the 20th century, was it applied to the domain of biological macromolecules. 
In light of the above, the research questions to which this paper seeks to respond can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
1. What are the structural and organisational features of artificial macroscopic 
machines, synthetic molecular machines and biological molecular machines? 
2. To what degree does the ‘machine-like’ analogy fit a class of molecular devices 
operating at the nanoscale? 
3. Is the ‘machine-like’ analogy appropriate for describing the operation of certain 
kinds of macromolecules in living cells? 
 
An understanding of the ontological status of (nano)machines has two important 
explanatory consequences for the neo-mechanistic debate and nanotechnology. First, the 
clarification of the term ʻmachineʼ may shed some light on the biological mechanisms 
that are based on them 1 . Second, since the cornerstone of nanotechnology is the 
possibility of artificially reproducing certain biological macromolecules, the differences 
between biological and artificial molecular machines highlight the limits of its 
theoretical framework. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses neo-
mechanistic accounts of ‘machine-likeness’. Then, Section 3 analyses the features of 
artificial macroscopic machines. Section 4 offers a critical exploration of the structure 
and functioning of synthetic and biological molecular machines, and Section 5 focuses 
on the specific case of biological molecular devices, taking into account the criticisms 
and arguments put forward by Moore (2012), Skillings (2015), and Nicholson (2013) 
against the machine-likeness of nanoscale devices. Finally, Section 6 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. The concepts of machine and mechanism in neo-mechanistic accounts in biology. 
A critical review. 
 
                                                          
1
 The term ʻmechanismʼ is currently used in neo-mechanistic literature for designating both the 
(epistemological) problem of the explanatory power of mechanistic explanations (among others, Bechtel 
and Richardson (1993) 2010; Glennan 1996; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005) and the (ontological) 
organisation of –namely biological- mechanisms (among others, Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; 
Craver 2001). When we state that we focus on the mechanisms “based on” (or performed by) machines, 
we merely claim that we describe, from an ontological perspective, the configuration of the mechanisms 
that are performed by the component parts of a specific kind of system (i.e. a machine). Hence, we do not 
address the issue of the explanatory power of mechanistic explanations. 
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The idea that organisms can be explained through an analogy with machines is rooted in 
Descartes' thinking, as laid out in Discourse on the Method (1637 (1999)) and Treatise 
on Man (1664 (1972)). Since the publication of these seminal works, it has been widely 
assumed2 that each anatomical part performs a distinct and specific biological function 
in the same (or at least, similar) way as the different parts of a machine make up a 
mechanism. The concepts of ‘machine’ and ‘mechanism’ are at the core of many 
biological descriptions (from genetics to evolutionary biology), and play a pivotal role 
in the neo-mechanistic view. 
However, until recently, no precise definition of the term ‘mechanism’ had been 
developed. The first basic mechanistic account was clearly provided by Machamer, 
Darden and Craver3 (2000), and has significantly influenced subsequent debates on not 
only the nature of biological mechanisms, but also the nature of machines. The MDC 
account defines biochemical mechanisms (e.g. neurotransmission and the mechanisms 
of DNA and RNA replication, transcription and translation) in terms of entities 
performing regular activities from start to finish conditions. Implicitly, this concept of 
mechanism is based on the way man-made machines work, since mechanisms have long 
been considered the functional parts of a machine-like system (Glennan 1996, pp. 51-
52; Bechtel and Richardson 2010, p. 17). Thus, as Nicholson points out (2012), one of 
the meanings sometimes carried by the concept of ‘mechanism’ is that of ‘machine’. 
Although these authors have developed a set of precise definitions for the concept of 
mechanism, they have not convincingly justified its relationship with the concept of 
machine. There are two main reasons for this. First, the development of a theory of 
machines has been essentially ignored by the advocates of mechanistic accounts in 
biology, who use the concept of mechanism in an epistemological-explanatory sense 
rather than an ontological one4. Consequently, the use of the machine analogy to explain 
biological systems has generally been supported by rather intuitive ideas about what a 
machine actually is. Second, some neo-mechanistic accounts have provided a very 
broad definition of ‘mechanism’ that encompasses both mechanisms which are based on 
machines and mechanisms which are not. Thus, the relationship between mechanisms 
and machines appears vague and unclear. We shall explain these two claims in more 
detail below. 
In relation to the first aspect, the definitions of mechanisms offered by Bechtel and 
Richardson (2010) and Glennan (1996), while emphasising the fact that mechanisms 
behave like the functional components of a machine, fail to provide a detailed analysis 
and description of the ontological status of a machine, or indeed the machine-like 
behaviour of some biological macromolecules. Rather, they focus on the 
epistemological nature of mechanistic explanations and, collaterally at least, the 
epistemological aspect of machine-likeness (i.e. the fact that a machine may be 
explained through mechanistic accounts). In the same vein, Levy (2014) links the 
concept of ‘machine-likeness’ to decompositional strategies5, since a machine can be 
decomposed by virtue of two features: first, the differentiation of parts (Levy 2014, p. 
5); and second, the local relations among the component parts (Levy 2014, pp. 5-6). In 
other words, modularity and internal interactions among the local functions of a system 
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 This is not to say that this view has not met with strong opposition (i.e. vitalism and, later, organicism). 
3
 Hereinafter, we shall refer to Machamer, Darden and Craver's account as the MDC definition. 
4
 Although Illari (2013) stresses that Bechtel’s view is epistemic whereas Craver’s account is ontic, we 
will not address this issue here. Instead, we will examine why a number of (mainly epistemological) 
accounts of (biological) mechanisms have not so far focused on the ontology of (nano)machines. 
5
 By decompositional strategies we mean an epistemological account of the behaviour of a system in 
terms of the local behaviour of its subsystems (component parts) and their causal interrelations (compare 
Bechtel and Richardson, 1993 (2010). 
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provide it with a certain degree of order, as well as decomposability, which in turn 
allow it to be defined as a ‘machine’. In spite of their importance, however, these 
aspects do not shed any light on the ontology of a machine. 
As regards the second claim, the MDC definition of mechanism in terms of ‘entities 
and activities organised such that they are productive of regular changes from start to 
termination conditions’ (MDC 2000, p. 3) is much broader and encompassing than the 
conceptual core of the operation of a machine. Here again there are two main reasons 
for this. First, because the component parts of a machine (the ‘entities’) are not only 
organised, but also held together in a (meta)stable structure, nearly in thermodynamic 
equilibrium6. Second, because ‘the activities’ of the components of a machine take place 
only when an input of energy occurs and are aimed at displacing a force, doing work or 
performing a function. Accordingly, the mechanism of a machine needs a 
thermodynamically-stable structure, and this requirement is not included in the MDC 
definition. An MDC mechanism could be either the result of the activities of parts 
organised in a thermodynamically-stable structure (and would therefore coincide with 
our concept of the mechanism of a machine), or the result of a far-from-equilibrium 
organised set of coupled processes. Many biochemical pathways indeed produce a 
functional activity (that which the MDC account defines as ‘mechanism’), which may 
be explained as resulting from clearly distinguished ‘parts’ (i.e. the chain of reactions 
catalysed by specific enzymes), understood as processes. However, as shown in the 
following sections, this kind of mechanism is not compatible with our concept of the 
mechanism of a machine, because a biochemical pathway fails to exhibit some 
important features of machines, such as a thermodynamically-stable structure or an 
energy input to do work. For these reasons, the basic mechanistic account provided by 
MDC does not clarify the difference between those mechanisms which are based on 
machines and those which are not. 
Usually neo-mechanistic accounts (notably Bechtel and Richardson (1993) 2010; 
MDC 2000; Craver 2001; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005) use the term ʻorganisationʼ to 
refer to the specific way the different parts of a machine are arranged so as to perform a 
given function. The use of this term is however a bit ambiguous. For, on the one hand, 
strictly speaking, the component parts and the operations of a machine may be said to 
be (structurally, spatially, and temporally) ordered. Yet, on the other hand, in order to 
perform a function, they should contribute to the maintenance of a system to which they 
belong (i.e., they are generated in this system, and they contribute to its maintenance). 
More precisely, we say that a machine performs a function insofar as it is embedded in a 
context (for example a specific social organisation) where certain material structures 
(i.e. machines) are produced. If machines are rightly designed and fabricated, they can 
also contribute to the maintenance of the context itself (for example the life of society to 
some extent depends on the existence of machines). And in a similar vein, certain 
macromolecular devices in the cell perform a function because they are embedded in the 
cellular ʻorganisationʼ, which they contribute to maintain and where they are produced. 
It is a human ʻorganisationʼ that produces an artificial machine and provides them with 
a specific function; and it is a biological ʻorganisationʼ that produces a molecular 
machine and provides them with a specific function. In both cases the term 
ʻorganisationʼ is what justifies that a given composite material structure, constraining a 
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 By this we mean that the structure of a machine (i.e. the specific assemblage of its component parts) 
would be preserved even if the exchange of matter and energy with its surroundings were almost zero (i.e. 
thermodynamic equilibrium). The stability of a structure is different from the functionality of a machine, 
because functionality requires an exchange of matter and energy between the machine and its 
surroundings. 
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flow of energy, achieves a function (see for details Mossio et al 2009 and Moreno and 
Mossio 2015). Derivatively, it would be sensible to say that the ordered structure of the 
functional parts constituting a machine is also “organised” in order to fulfil the global 
function performed by the machine as a whole. 
In sum, the (neo)mechanistic use of the term ‘mechanistic explanation’ is much more 
liberal than ours, as we focus only on the mechanisms performed by machines. Since 
the purpose of this paper is to conduct an ontological examination of the concept of 
‘machine’, we will not enter here into current (and important) debates about the 
explanatory validity or limits of the (neo)mechanistic accounts, particularly in light of 
the challenges raised by the success of network-like explanations, which are usually 
incompatible with the idea of functional decomposition (Zednik 2011; Kaplan 2015; 
Bechtel 2017). 
Although the neo-mechanistic debate has so far devoted most of its attention to the 
epistemology of biological mechanisms, there is still a long tradition of studies on the 
structure and functioning of man-made machines. Serious attempts to define what a 
machine actually is can be traced back to the second half of the 19st century, when the 
German engineer Franz Reuleaux developed a theory which posited that a machine is a 
kinematic chain of elementary links called ‘kinematic pairs’. In his book ‘The 
Kinematics of Machinery’, the term ‘machine’ refers to a system that converts an 
energy input into an energy output by exploiting the mechanism(s) of its component 
parts that displace an applied force and, therefore, do work (Reuleaux 1876)7. The 
functional components of a machine exhibit a specific design that allows them to 
harness the physicochemical processes underlying the behaviour of said machine. In 
other words, a machine is a set of functional constraints that are interlocked so as to 
harness the action of physical laws in order to achieve a new (composite-integrated) 
function, as pointed out by Polanyi (1968). To do so, a functional hierarchy must be 
established, and a spatial and temporal order must be imposed on the functional 
constraints. As Wimsatt (1986) highlighted, the functional components of many 
machines can be partially intersubstituted within a certain range of configurations and 
without changing systemic properties. As a result, the nature of a composite-integrated 
function of a machine is determined by the structure and functions of its constituents 
(principle of compositionality). A crucial feature of machines is that they consist of a 
number of modular parts that are assembled according to a specific design so as to 
assume a distinctive shape. Accordingly, the pieces of a machine can be isolated due to 
modularity, and are gathered in a very specific way in order to perform a certain 
function. Another essential feature of a machine is its compactness, namely the 
structural co-dependence of its component parts, which is a result of the design of the 
machine. Compactness allows a machine to exhibit clear boundaries that distinctly 
distinguish it from its surroundings. 
In the light of the above, we recognise that there is a tension between the concepts of 
ʻmachineʼ and ʻmechanismʼ in the current neo-mechanistic framework. We propose to 
resolve this ambiguity as follows: we define a machine as a meta-stable structure, which 
can persist in thermodynamic equilibrium, consisting of a number of functional 
interdependent parts that constrain an energy flow to do work and perform a systemic 
function. We characterise a mechanism performed by a machine as the set of all 
functions carried out by the component parts of the machine that allow it to harness a 
flow of energy and matter and to do work. In other words, ʻmachineʼ designates a 
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 This author defined a machine as ‘a combination of resistant bodies so arranged that by their means the 
mechanical forces of nature can be compelled to do work accompanied by certain determinate motion.’ 
(Reuleaux 1876). 
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certain kind of a structure, whereas a ʻmechanism based on a machineʼ refers to its 
systemic functionality. The mechanism of a machine is the result not only of the specific 
structure of a machine, but also of a human or biological context that provides a 
machine with a specific (structural) order of its component parts and a particular 
mechanism. Indeed, to a certain degree, one can abstract the functioning of a machine 
from its material and organisational embodiment. Yet, although features such as design, 
structural stability, shape, compactness, modularity and compositionality pertain to the 
structure (i.e. to machine), but not its functionality (i.e. its mechanism), they should 
indirectly inform our understanding of a mechanism also. As a matter of fact, the 
mechanisms of each machine constrain a flow of energy by virtue of the specific shape 
of the component parts of a machine and the way in which they are ordered. 
For these reasons, in this paper we will focus on the nature of machines (what they are 
and what aspects define their operations) and analyse to what extent the machine-
analogy can be applied to the core of all living organisations, i.e. the cell. It is true that 
biological machines are microscopic and their physicochemical properties are very 
different from those of macroscopic machines. But before analysing the implications of 
the nanoscale, we shall first clarify what a machine is by analysing the example of 
artificial macroscopic machines. 
 
3. Artificial macroscopic machines8 
 
The oldest and simplest macroscopic machines can be traced back to Archimedean 
simple machines (e.g. levers, screws and pulleys, etc.), which are devices that modify 
the direction or magnitude of a force in order to do work against a single load force. 
Simple machines are often considered the building blocks of more complex ‘compound 
machines’. Power sources are exploited to transmit power9 or transform motion and, 
therefore, perform a mechanism10. Both simple and compound machines do work by 
harnessing a flow of energy into an ordered process so as to achieve a pre-specified 
function11. This is made possible by a set of specific material structures, which act as 
constraints, functionally harnessing the flow of energy so as to produce a forward 
motion. When a macroscopic machine is at work, the summation of all external forces 
and torque is not zero (the machine is far from mechanical equilibrium). Since the 
movement and the work of a macroscopic machine are the outcome of the relative 
internal motion of its component parts, they must be assembled in an ordered way 
(following specific design rules) in order to achieve a functionally-integrated operation. 
This is commonly referred to as the ‘structure’ of a machine. 
The design of a macroscopic machine is closely linked to its functionality, insofar as  
shape, form, and size scale determine certain kinds of mechanisms and not others. 
According to Reuleaux (1876), a machine consists of an assemblage of resistant bodies 
(links), which are connected together (the so-called ‘kinematic pairs’) by movable joints 
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 In this section we mainly refer to mechanical machines such as steam machines, cars, pumps, etc. Of 
course, there are many other kinds of non-mechanical machines (e.g. computers) which we have not 
described here, because all of them share the same basic features of what we have called ‘machine’. 
Hence, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on mechanical machines as paradigmatic examples of artificial 
macroscopic machines. 
9
 Power is the transmission of energy from the place where it is generated to another place, so as to 
perform useful work. 
10
 In machine theory, when one link is chosen as the framework of reference for the movement of all other 
links, it is called the ‘frame link’. Once a frame link is set out in a kinetic chain, and it is possible to 
generate an output motion in response to an input motion, the kinetic chain is called a ‘mechanism’. 
11
 Needless to say, the function of an artificial macroscopic machine is specified by its designer. 
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so as to form a kinematic chain with one link fixed and having the purpose of 
transforming motion. Reuleaux’s characterization of machines primarily encompasses 
mechanical devices and, therefore, considers component parts as rigid structures. 
However, many contemporary machines exhibit constituents which are not rigid, but 
rather flexible, such as magnetic parts (e.g. in an electromagnetic coil), fluidic 
components (e.g. in a refrigerator), and so forth. The links of a machine are structures 
that move in the air or in a vacuum by exhibiting relative motion that is constrained by 
the number of links, the type of joint used to connect them and the shape of the mating 
surfaces. Each link is connected to the other links through joints that transmit movement 
from the input link (‘driver’) to the output link (‘follower’). Since each link is aimed at 
maintaining constant spatial relationships between the elements of its pairs (Dicker et al. 
2003, p. 6), the way in which the pieces of a machine are assembled together is crucial 
to defining the mechanism, the work, and the kind of function performed. As a matter of 
fact, the overall function of a machine hinges on the compositionality of the local 
functions performed by its parts. A good example of a macroscopic machine design is a 
gear pump, which exploits the rotation of gears to displace fluids. A gear pump consists 
of two gears (links) that are connected through a contact zone (movable joint) which 
allows two gears to pivot with respect to each other in such a way that they form a 
kinematic chain. In order to work properly, each gear must maintain a specific angle 
with respect to the other one (constant spatial relationship). It is important to underline 
that a key requirement for macroscopic machines is that the parts be structurally co-
dependent, so that the overall organisation is stable and, at the same time, compact, with 
clear spatial boundaries. 
The structure of a macroscopic machine (i.e. the structural interdependence among its 
parts) may be said ʻstableʼ, because it is maintained regardless of whether or not the 
device is actually doing work (and performing a function). For example, the structure of 
a refrigerator or a car is stable, since it is maintained regardless of whether or not these 
machines are switched on or off (i.e. if they actually work or not). Then, macroscopic 
machines may be defined as ʻcompactʼ, because they exhibit a specific design and their 
component parts are assembled in such a way to be closely and firmly united in a 
distinct pattern . For example, the component parts of a refrigerator or a car are closely 
interlocked in such a way that they have a compact aspect. Finally, the component parts 
of a macroscopic machine show clear spatial boundaries, because their different pieces 
are assembled in a specific way so as to build a macroscopic device. For instance, a 
refrigerator is composed of clear distinct assembled parts such as a thermally insulated 
compartment and a heat pump that transfers the heat from the inside to the outside of 
the refrigerator. 
Thus, the component parts of an artificial macroscopic machine perform a mechanism 
because of the ordered structure of their constraints. This ordered structure of 
constraints is evident in the way in which the links are assembled (design) so as to 
channel the motion of each part in a certain direction. The structure of constraints is 
designed so as to minimise the inertial and friction forces acting on the parts (i.e. the 
links) of the machine. Friction forces, which act on the mating surfaces between two 
links, affect the motion of the parts of a macroscopic machine, because friction forces 
(i.e. dry friction) determine the tractive force between a body and a tangential force. 
Much the same occurs with inertial forces, which oppose any change in the velocity of 
motion or the torque of a rigid body. Since friction and inertia influence the sliding 
velocity of the mating surfaces of the links and any changes in their velocity 
(respectively), the overall movement, and thus the mechanism, of a macroscopic 
machine is inevitably affected by these physical forces. 
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All in all, to constitute a mechanism in a macroscopic machine, each link of a 
kinematic chain must exhibit a specific shape and dimension, as well as a distinct 
connection with the other links in such a way as to ensure a certain degree of freedom 
(DOF)12 and, therefore, perform a relative motion. Since design is crucial to enabling 
the component parts to work and to perform a certain function, the links of a machine 
(e.g. wheels, gears, cams and pistons, etc.) must be assembled in a particular way so as 
to perform a certain kind of mechanism and a specific function. For example, a four-bar 
linkage (see Fig 1 A four-bar linkage: O2, A, B, and O4 are the joints that allow links (2, 
3, 4) to move with a specific angle (β and γ). The link 2 is the input link and the link 4 
the output link. (Simón 2016, p. 15)) is a mechanism that can perform a wide variety of 
movements depending on how the four links are assembled and connected together: it 
can be employed in a pumpjack to draw oil from the subsoil by using a planar 
quadrilateral linkage; or alternatively, it can be used in a train suspension mechanism to 
allow the wheel to rotate through a slider-crank linkage. In short, the concepts 
‘mechanism’, ‘function’ and ‘work’ in a macroscopic machine should be understood in 
terms of how the component parts are assembled so as to achieve a functionally-
integrated action. 
 
[Insert here Fig 1] 
 
4. Molecular machines 
 
Having clarified the core concept of ‘machine’, we will now turn to what are often 
referred to as ‘molecular machines’. Here we find two very different systems: 
‘molecular machines’ and biological ‘molecular machines’, which while sharing many 
features, also diverge in many other important ways. For this reason, we shall divide our 
analysis into two parts. Firstly, we shall argue why, despite the specific differences 
generated by the nanoscale, it is still correct to talk about machines at the molecular 
scale. And secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we shall explore why it also makes 
sense to classify certain macromolecular structures operating in cells as machines. 
Let us begin by considering, from a generic perspective, the current view regarding 
what a ‘molecular machine’ (MM) actually is. First of all, an MM is defined as any 
discrete number of molecular components that produce quasi-mechanical movements 
(output) in response to specific stimuli (input) (Ballardini et al. 2001). Unlike 
macroscopic machines, the configuration space of MMs is not defined by their six 
degrees of freedom 13 , but rather by their free-energy landscapes 14  (i.e. Gibbs free 
energy15 of interacting molecules) (Astumian and Hänggi 2002; Astumian et al. 2016). 
More specifically, MMs are characterised by three important elements: firstly, thermal 
noise; secondly, structural anisotropy; and, thirdly, an energy input (Astumian 2002). 
Thermal noise16 acts as ʻthermal activatorʼ of MMs, since it provides them with an 
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 The degree of freedom (DOF) of a mechanical system is defined as ‘the number of independent 
parameters that unambiguously define its position in space at every instant’ (Simón et al. 2016, p. 2). 
13
 The six degrees of freedom of a macroscopic rigid body are defined by three rotatory movements (roll, 
pitch, yaw) and three translational movements (surge, heave, sway). 
14
 The energy landscape is the mapping of all possible spatial conformations of a molecule. The energy 
landscape is a continuous function that associates each physical state of the molecule with the 
corresponding energy. 
15
 Gibbs free energy is a thermodynamic potential used by a thermodynamic system to do work at a 
constant temperature and pressure. The simple equation for Gibbs free energy is: ΔG = ΔH-TΔS, where 
ΔH is the enthalpy change and ΔS is the change in entropy of the process. 
16
 Thermal noise is the electronic noise determined by the thermal agitation of the charge carriers. 
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amount of energy to overcome energy barriers17. If the noise intensity is low, molecules 
are pinned at a potential minimum and they cannot diffuse; on the contrary, if the noise 
intensity is high, molecules overcome the potential barrier and begin to diffuse 
(Astumian 2002; Astumian and Hänggi 2002). Thermal noise randomly ʻpushesʼ an 
MM back and forth without a specific direction. Nevertheless, MMs exhibit a 
directional movement by combining structural anisotropy with an energy input 
(Astumian and Hänggi 2002). Structural anisotropy is the asymmetric distribution of 
reaction products around an MM and it acts as an asymmetric kinetic barrier. When an 
energy input (chemical, photochemical, etc.) is provided, structural anisotropy generates 
a concentration gradient of chemical potential that constrains Brownian motion and 
generates a directed motion of an MM. Thus, as a result of the interplay between 
thermal noise, structural anisotropy, and an energy input, an MM is able to functionally 
harness an energy source, constrain Brownian motion and perform a (biological) task18. 
It is crucial to emphasise that MMs usually operate in aqueous solutions where they 
are subject not only to important thermal fluctuations, but also to viscous forces that 
render inertial ones negligible. Since the role played by viscous forces is completely 
different at the macroscopic and microscopic levels, the Reynolds number19  (i.e. a 
dimensionless parameter comparing the effect of inertial and viscous forces) is different 
for macroscopic and microscopic devices. Macroscopic machines have a high Reynolds 
number, and inertial forces are important whereas viscous ones are negligible. 
Microscopic machines, on the other hand, have a low Reynolds number, meaning that 
viscous forces are fundamental and inertial forces negligible within the system. 
Unlike macroscopic machines, MMs operate very near to mechanical equilibrium 
because the viscous drag force20 is equal and opposite the net mechanical force. The 
‘mechanical equilibrium’ of a molecular system is a dynamic condition in which every 
forward motion of a particle is cancelled by its microscopic reverse (i.e. a backward 
motion) (Astumian 2012), and it is therefore different from the concept of 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Accordingly, the presence of a ratchet mechanism in an 
MM allows it not only to direct movement but also to keep the system very near to, but 
not at, mechanical equilibrium. Although MMs are close to mechanical equilibrium, 
they are far from thermodynamic equilibrium, since they dissipate energy to their 
environment. 
Unlike macroscopic machines, which exploit many different energy sources 
(mechanical, thermal, chemical, electrical, etc.), MMs consume chemical, 
photochemical, and electrochemical energy. Chemically-driven MMs are subjected not 
only to thermal noise but also to the principle of microscopic reversibility, according to 
which at equilibrium the forward and backward paths of a reversible reaction are 
equally likely to occur. In order to overcome microscopic reversibility, chemically-
driven MMs cyclically switch between different mechanical states, a process known as 
‘chemical gating’, during which the selective binding/unbinding of a catalyst allows the 
device to increase its chemical potential and modify the reaction rate constant in such a 
                                                          
17
 Energy barrier (or activation energy) is the least amount of energy required to trigger a chemical 
reaction. 
18
 Feynman (1963) pointed out that it is impossible to have a molecular device (the so-called ʻBrownian 
ratchetʼ) that is able to extract work from thermal noise because of the inviolability of the second law of 
thermodynamics. However, a molecular machine does combine thermal noise with structural anisotropy 
and energy (chemical, photochemical, and electrochemical) sources to do work. For this reason, MMs are 
also called ʻBrownian ratchetsʼ (Astumian 2002). 
19
 Reynolds number is expressed by the ratio between avρ and η (R = avρ/η); where a is the acceleration, 
v the velocity, ρ the density of the fluid, and η the fluid's viscosity (Astumian and Hänggi 2002, p. 33). 
20
 Viscous drag force is the force exerted by a fluid on an obstacle around which it flows. 
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way that the reaction can follow only one path (forward or backward). As a result, the 
mechanochemical cycle of binding/unbinding a catalyst is the way in which chemically-
driven MMs constrain a chemical energy input in order to carry out directional 
movement, do work, and bypass microscopic reversibility (Astumian 2012; Astumian et 
al. 2016). 
Unlike chemically-driven MMs, light-driven ones exploit the allosteric 
conformational change generated by exergonic reactions (known as ‘power stroke’) to 
allow light energy to maintain a non-equilibrium steady state, thereby permitting 
molecules to move between two separate energy surfaces (Astumian et al. 2016). 
Another significant difference between chemically and light-driven machines is 
microscopic reversibility, since the former are subject to microscopic reversibility 
whereas the latter are not (Astumian et al. 2016). 
In light of all these factors, it is sensible to avoid a hasty analogy between MMs and 
all types of macroscopic machines. A careful analysis is therefore required to assess the 
question. In the following two subsections we will analyse the structural and 
physicochemical organisation of both artificial (Section 4.1) and biological (Section 
4.2) MMs. 
 
4.1 Artificial MMs 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a host of molecular devices have been 
artificially developed for technological use in different domains (nano-medicine, green 
nanotechnology, etc.) and with very different purposes. Nanotechnology can be 
considered an extension of supramolecular chemistry, a new avenue opened up during 
the 1970s (Lehn 1995). Artificial MMs (also called ‘supramolecular structures’) are 
built by assembling a discrete number of molecular components with the aim of 
performing a function through the mechanical movement of their parts. Energy sources 
are provided by photochemical and electrochemical energy inputs that cause exergonic 
reactions 21 , which in turn power these artificial nano-devices. Photochemical and 
electrochemical energy is transformed into mechanical work through a ‘motor-like’ 
part. 
Unlike macroscopic machines, MMs are built by harnessing the intrinsic self-
assembly capacities of certain molecular components, according to which these 
components bind together through non-covalent interactions in such a way that the final 
assembled structure is able to perform mechanical movements (linear, rotatory, 
oscillatory, etc.), thus enabling a specific function to be carried out. This method for 
building an MM is called bottom-up assembly22. Artificial nano-machines are based on 
rotaxanes, catenanes and other related structures (Sauvage and Dietrich-Buchecker 
1999; Balzani et al. 2005) which are assembled by employing non-covalent interactions 
such as hydrogen bonding, coulombic forces and metal-ligand bonding, among others. 
Rotaxanes are dumbbell-shaped molecules surrounded by a macrocyclic compound with 
a ball at each end; catenanes consist of two interlocked rings (macrocycles) (Balzani et 
al. 2005) (see Fig 2 Interactions between a rotaxane and a macrocycle: a) ring shuttling, 
b) ring rotation, c) threading/dethreading equilibrium between a macrocycle and the 
axle of a pseudorotaxane (Credi et al. 2014, p. 6)). 
 
[Insert here Fig 2] 
                                                          
21
 Endergonic reactions can also occur, but they have to be thermodynamically coupled with exergonic 
reactions in such a way that exergonic reactions drive or power endergonic ones. 
22
 By a ‘bottom-up’ approach to molecular machines, we mean the construction of nanoscale devices and 
machines using a molecule-by-molecule method (Balzani et al. 2005). 
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Like macroscopic machines, synthetic nano-devices carry out work and perform a 
function by virtue of the way certain molecular parts have been shaped and located so as 
to affect the relative motion of other component parts and, all together, harness the 
energy flow in a specific way. It is the interlocked architecture of the components (i.e. 
their design and structural co-dependence) that permits the overall system to transform 
an energy input into work, in order to perform a desired function. Like the links of a 
macroscopic machine, rotaxanes and catenanes generate relative motion23 as the result 
of an energy input. Both mechanical movements and a variety of different functions of 
the molecular components of rotaxanes and catenanes are induced by external 
stimulation. For example, acid-base chemical inputs may strengthen or weaken the 
hydrogen bonding interactions that are responsible for assembly and spatial 
organisation. Another important physical constraint on the behaviour of rotaxanes and 
catenanes is represented by non-covalent interactions, since these interactions allow 
them to bind to one another reversibly. Since non-covalent interactions easily bind (and 
unbind) the component parts of a synthetic nano-device, supramolecular stability hinges 
on the control of these weak interactions. Thus, the basic principle underlying the 
construction of artificial MMs is control of the non-covalent interactions that govern the 
relative mechanical movement of the building blocks so as to create a functionally-
integrated structure that is able to perform work, transport cargoes or signal molecules 
through molecular shuttles, etc. (Valero et al. 2017). 
One example of artificial MMs is DNA nanotechnology (see Fig 3 Representation of a 
DNA architecture a) double strand DNA rotaxane with spherical stoppers; b) controlled 
release of the rings; c) a gold (Au) nanoparticle hybridizes two DNA rotaxanes; d) DNA 
origami rotaxane (Valero et al. 2017, p. 161)), which combines rotaxanes, catenanes and 
related structures to create interlocked DNA structures that can be generated from both 
double-stranded and single-stranded DNA (Ackermann et al. 2010; Valero et al. 2017). 
 
[Insert here Fig 3] 
 
4.2 Biological MMs 
Biological MMs are a subgroup of macromolecules (mainly proteins) that are 
commonly found in both prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells. Noteworthy examples 
include molecular motors (such as dynein, myosin and kinesin), molecular pumps (such 
as transmembrane ATPases), molecular tweezers (such as DNA) and molecular 
switches (like rhodopsin)24 . In the cellular environment, proteins are the molecular 
structures best suited to acting like ‘machines’, because their structure allows them to 
perform a wide variety of biochemical functions (from catalysis to cell signalling and 
signal transduction, and from cellular motility to ligand binding). 
Here, we will analyse only biomolecular motors and pumps, since they are the best 
candidates to be considered MMs. There are two crucial features of biomolecular 
motors and pumps to take into consideration. First, like synthetic nano-devices, 
biomolecular motors and pumps emerge from self-assembly processes by harnessing the 
entropic effect generated by the translational displacement of the water molecules in the 
cytoplasm. Self-assembly occurs spontaneously if Gibbs free energy is negative 
                                                          
23
 Rotaxanes and catenanes usually perform relative motion through the movements of rings, such as 
shuttling along the axle of the rotaxane dumbbell or rotation around another ring in a catenane structure. 
24
 Whereas molecular motors are able to displace unidirectionally when powered by an external energy 
input, molecular tweezers hold items between their two arms. A molecular switch reversibly shifts 
between two or more stable states. 
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(O'Mahoni et al. 2011). Since an increase in the entropy of the water molecules 
decreases their Gibbs free energy, the self-assembly process is stimulated within the 
cytoplasmic environment (Kinoshita 2016). And, second, since modularity lies in the 
fact that biomolecular motors and pumps are proteins, and proteins consist of modular 
parts (Trifonov and Frenkel 2009; Rorick and Wagner 2011), another important feature 
of most of MMs is modularity. As a matter of fact, they consist of a number of subunits, 
each with a specific size and form, which are integrated in order to keep the global 
structure stable and transform chemical energy into mechanical work by means of a 
mechanochemical cycle. Three examples of biomolecular motors are myosin, kinesin 
and dynein, on the one hand, and an example of pump is the F0F1ATPase, on the other. 
Kinesin, myosin and dynein25 are polymers generated by the self-assembly of their 
respective monomers. The movement of these biomolecular motors is due to a series of 
mechanochemical cycles during which a phosphoryl group, removed by ATP 
hydrolysis, causes a rearrangement of the elements of the ATP-binding site in the 
globular head, which in turn triggers structural changes in the track binding site. Next, 
the electrochemical energy generated by the motor domain is transduced by the neck 
domain into mechanical work by producing movement. When a phosphoryl group is 
released, a conformational change occurs in the globular head and the mechanochemical 
cycle ends. 
F0F1ATPase (see Fig 4 Regions, subunits, and rotatory movement of F0F1ATPase: F0 
region (subunits a and c), F1 region (the other subunits) (Wilkens 2000, p. 338)) is a 
protein located in the inner mitochondrial membrane, which is synthesised by 
assembling a number of monomers into eight subunits and two functional regions (F0 
and F1). Since the function of regions F0 and F1 is likened to that of the stator and rotor 
(respectively) of an electric motor, F0F1ATPase is considered a vivid illustration of a 
biomolecular motor. The F0 subunits channel a proton flux, determined by an 
electrochemical gradient, which is exploited to allow F1 to rotate. The rotatory 
movement is not random (but rather directed by subunits a and c of F0) and determines 
the conformational change of subunit β of F1, thus enabling the synthesis of ATP 
molecules (see Fig 5 Conformational changes of the subunit β of F1 in order to 
synthesize ATP molecules (Feniouk and Yoshida 2008, p. 283)).  
 
[Insert here Figg 4 and 5] 
 
A biological MM exists and performs work not only because of self-assembly and 
modularity, but also due to three structural principles. First, reactions occurring in the 
different subunits are sequentially ordered so as to form a clear-cut biochemical 
pathway. Second, macromolecular conformational change, which is allosterically 
regulated, is temporally coordinated with the reactions occurring in the other subunits 
of the protein complex. And finally, and this is the most important point, the overall 
function of a biomolecular machine depends on its relationship with other biological 
molecules that are present in the biochemical network of the cell. These structural 
principles underlie the behaviour of all biomolecular machines. By way of example, let 
us again consider F0F1ATPase. The rotation of the γ subunit of the F1 region may occur 
only if the subunits of the F0 region have previously constrained the proton flux towards 
the F1 region (sequential order). In order to produce three ATP molecules, the rotatory 
movement of F1 must be coupled with the conformational change (three states) of 
                                                          
25
 Dynein is a protein that transports cargoes along microtubules in a cell by exploiting retrograde 
transport. Myosin is a protein that allows muscle contraction by interacting with actin. Kinesin is a 
protein that transports cargoes by sliding down microtubule filaments (anterograde transport). 
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subunit β, in such a way that the phosphorylation of ADP generates an ATP molecule 
(temporal coordination). It is important to stress that the rotation of F1 must be coupled 
with ATP hydrolysis, otherwise, a futile cycle occurs without ATP production. Finally, 
since the electrochemical gradient proton flux through the ATP synthase depends on the 
electron flux produced by the electron transport chain, the overall function of 
F0F1ATPase hinges on the biochemical pathways established in the protein complexes 
of the electron transport chain (relationship with other biological molecules). 
The interdependence between a biological MM and the cell network is a key aspect 
that distinguishes MMs from artificial nano-devices. The functional integration of a 
biomolecular machine into the cellular network is a crucial organisational feature that 
makes it difficult to separate a biomolecular machine from its biochemical network, 
while at the same time explaining why artificial molecular machines are still a long way 
from being similar to biological ones. Biological MMs are embedded in a biochemical 
network in such a way that they appear functionally integrated into other biomolecular 
machines or biological macromolecules. This third characteristic is a key difference 
between artificial nano-devices and biomolecular machines, because synthetic nano-
machines have not so far been incorporated into artificial biochemical networks. 
Consequently, whereas the energy input of biomolecular motors is constantly provided 
by the biochemical network in such a way that biological machines regenerate, synthetic 
nano-machines cannot do this, and therefore need an opposite input to reset (Balzani et 
al. 2005; Credi et al. 2014). 
 
5. Machine-likeness at the nanoscale 
 
In the previous sections, our analysis of the structural and physicochemical conditions 
required by macroscopic and molecular machines has revealed that both types share a 
fundamental similarity in their organisation, since both are meta-stable structures 
consisting of functional parts that constrain an energy input so as to perform work and, 
therefore, fulfil a systemic function. This similarity is the main reason why a machine-
based terminology is so widely used in the specialist literature to characterise these 
types of artificial and biological molecular systems. 
Admittedly, this is not a sufficient reason to dismiss the importance of the differences 
which exist between classic macroscopic machines and their molecular analogues. As a 
matter of fact, several critical voices have recently raised fundamental objections to the 
consideration of molecular devices as machines. To be fair, however, these criticisms 
are directed mainly at biological molecular machines, and fail to address (explicitly, at 
least) the case of their artificial counterparts. Yet, since many of these criticisms discuss 
aspects linked purely to scale differences, we believe they implicitly include a rejection 
of the adequacy of a machine-based terminology to describe artificial molecular devices 
also. In this section we will discuss the criticisms levelled by three authors: Moore, 
Skillings and Nicholson, before presenting our own view of the question. Whereas the 
arguments espoused by the first two authors focus exclusively on scale differences (and 
therefore, even though they only explicitly discuss the case of biological MMs, their 
arguments encompass artificial MMs also), Nicholson’s criticism raises questions which 
pertain only to biological MMs. Thus, in our own analysis, we shall attempt to 
distinguish which part of the discussion specifically concerns only the biological case. 
In a paper published in 2012, Peter Moore argues that macromolecules cannot be 
considered molecular machines because they are subject to physicochemical forces that 
are different from those of macroscopic machines, a circumstance which makes the 
analogy between macroscopic machines and macromolecules inappropriate. Moreover, 
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he adds that ‘the use of the word “machine” is pernicious because of its implication that 
the functional properties of macromolecules can be explained mechanically, which is 
simply not true’ (Moore 2012, pp. 7-8). Moore is certainly right in claiming that the 
physicochemical laws underlying macroscopic machines are different from those of 
microscopic macromolecules, because a different size scale entails a great difference 
both in the structure and in the functions performed by these two kinds of device. As 
seen in Section 4, the behaviour of both biological and synthetic macromolecular 
devices is influenced by viscous forces, thermal noise and potential energy differences 
in the free-energy landscape of macromolecules, etc. Together, these factors make the 
behaviour of these macromolecular structures probabilistic, not deterministic, because 
the laws of quantum mechanics replace Newton's laws of mechanics. In this sense, 
Moore is right in saying that the expression ‘Brownian ratchet’ should not be read in the 
deterministic sense of Newtonian mechanics (Moore 2012, p. 10), but rather as a 
linguistic label to simplify the interplay between structural anisotropy and an energy 
input to harness thermal noise. The criticism levelled by Moore (2012, p. 7) at 
‘structure-based movies’26 of macromolecules is also fair, insofar as they are indeed an 
oversimplification of how real macromolecules (e.g. ribosomes, myosin, dynein, 
F0F1ATPase and so forth) generate motion and carry out work. In other words, Moore is 
right in claiming that the directional movement of macromolecules is not the same as 
that of a macroscopic machine (a car, for instance), because motion at the nanoscale is 
stochastic, not deterministic. 
However, we do not agree with Moore’s argument that these differences preclude the 
possibility of talking about (certain types of) macromolecular systems in terms of 
machines. Although they are indeed different from macroscopic machines due to the 
action of diverse physicochemical forces, they nevertheless share a common 
organisation. As we have seen, both macroscopic machines and the microscopic 
(biological as well as synthetic) devices studied so far are characterised by a number of 
functionally-ordered component parts that act as constraints on an energy input in order 
to do (useful) work. Moore (2012, p. 9) maintains that the operation of the component 
parts of a macromolecular ‘machine’ (e.g. the two subunits of a ribosome) are not 
directly related to their function because thermal fluctuations ‘separate one functionally 
significant event from the next’ (Moore 2012, p. 9). Thermal noise indeed distinguishes 
between macroscopic and microscopic causal sequence (which is deterministic in the 
former and probabilistic in the latter), but this does not prevent the global result of the 
device from being explained in terms of a specific sequence of functional operations. 
Hence, the specific way in which a macromolecular device behaves (e.g. the ribosome 
function of synthesising peptides) is due to the sequential organisation of a number of 
functions that are locally performed by the component parts of that same 
macromolecular device (e.g. the two subunits of a ribosome). Like macroscopic 
machines, microscopic ones carry out systemic functions by virtue of the organisation of 
the local functions fulfilled by their component parts. 
The aim of Skillings’ (2015) paper is to show the limits of the basic mechanistic 
account in explaining molecular processes and to propose a larger mechanistic 
framework in terms of multidimensional gradient. He does not openly criticise the idea 
of machine-likeness at nano-scale. However, he makes a comparison between 
macroscopic mechanical machines (such as a watch) and macromolecules (such as a 
ribosome) and he claims, in line with Moore (2012), that “the movements and the 
interactions of the parts of the watch explain how the watch works. The parts of a 
                                                          
26
 By this term Moore means all those pictures that depict the motion of macromolecules as a linear 
movement produced solely from their component parts. 
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protein, like a ribosome, do not stand in the same relations as the parts of a mechanical 
clock” (Skillings 2015, p. 1145). Although this is undoubtedly correct, we find that it 
may lead to a misleading idea of ʻmachineʼ which is based on a (macroscopic) 
mechanical machine (like a watch). As we have already emphasised in section 2, a 
machine is a meta-stable structure consisting of interdependent parts which constrain a 
flow of energy and matter in order to do work and perform a systemic function. 
Accordingly, a machine is a kind of structure that encompasses different types of 
macroscopic and microscopic systems and, therefore, cannot be reduced to a 
(macroscopic) mechanical machine. In other words, both Moore’s (2012) and Skillings’ 
(2015) papers correctly criticise a rough analogy between (macroscopic) mechanical 
machines and MMs. However, these papers give the impression (Moore more explicitly, 
whereas Skillings implicitly) that it is wrong to consider artificial nano-devices, 
biomolecular motors and pumps, and ribosomes as machines at all. We argue that a 
broader, but at the same time more precise, definition of ʻmachineʼ does not prevent us 
to regard this subset of macromolecules as machines. 
In addition to Moore’s and Skillings’ arguments, Nicholson (2013) also maintains 
that, if biological macromolecules were machines, they should have an organisation 
created by an intelligent designer, since “confronted with a machine, one is justified in 
inferring the existence of an external creator responsible for producing it in accordance 
with a preconceived plan or design” (Nicholson 2013, p. 671). Nicholson's claim can be 
dismissed by arguing that the existence of an intelligent designer is a necessary 
condition for achieving functional organisation in man-made machines (and for defining 
what is a useful task), but neither the existence of functional tasks nor the origin of the 
order of the (sub)functions involved in such tasks require an intelligent designer in 
biological systems. These two aspects may be explained by bearing in mind that 
biological systems are a very special form of self-sustaining organisation, capable of 
harbouring functional differentiation and undergoing an evolutionary history. 
In a recent paper, Nicholson (2018) criticises the analogy between machines and 
organisms by offering some arguments taken from thermodynamics. Even though the 
paper focuses on organisms as wholes, it is possible to apply some criticisms of the 
machine-likeness of living beings to biological macromolecules. Nicholson argues that 
there are three important differences between machines and biological organisations. 
First, “organisms have to constantly exchange energy and matter with their 
surroundings in order to maintain themselves far from thermodynamic equilibrium. 
Machines, on the other hand, exist in equilibrium or near-equilibrium conditions, and 
consequently do not have to constantly exchange energy and matter with their 
surroundings” (Nicholson 2018, p. 144). Second, machines are characterised by static 
stability (i.e. they do not need an energy input to preserve their structure), whereas 
biological organisations “exhibit a dynamical stability, which is based on their capacity 
to actively maintained a low-entropic ʻsteady-stateʼ” (Nicholson 2018, p. 144). And 
third, the activity of a machine is temporary because of its switching on/off, while “the 
actively-maintained steady-state of an organism is fixed and irreversible” (Nicholson 
2018, p. 144). Despite being correct, these remarks do not preclude the fact that, within 
a biological system as a whole, there are parts which exhibit a certain degree of stability 
in near-to-equilibrium conditions (i.e. self-assembling complex structures) and that, in 
particular, some biological macromolecules –notably biomolecular motors and pumps- 
have features (i.e. being near thermodynamic equilibrium, exhibiting static stability and 
temporary activity, etc.27) that allow them to be talked about in terms of machines. 
                                                          
27
 One good example of this is how F0F1ATPase behaves in brown adipose tissue. The presence of an 
uncoupling protein (UCP) within the inner mitochondrial membrane dissipates the proton gradient 
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Thus, we believe that, despite all the aforementioned differences, these features (being 
near thermodynamic equilibrium, exhibiting static stability and temporary activity) 
allow us to subsume both macroscopic and microscopic man-made machines and a 
subset of macromolecules into the concept of ʻmachineʼ. 
Nicholson is right to point out that biomachines exist within and hinge on a dissipative 
and autonomous organisation. If biological MMs exist, it is because they contribute to 
creating and maintaining a network of dependencies, namely a true ‘closure of 
(macromolecular) machines’, and this global network (i.e. the cell) exists in far-from-
equilibrium conditions (Winning and Bechtel 2018). As a result, in spite of being 
precarious dynamical macromolecular structures, biomachines are relatively stable, 
since they are produced, regenerated and repaired within a network that they in turn 
create and support. Furthermore, as we acknowledge in Section 4.2, biomachines also 
perform their functions in so far as they coordinate their operations with many other 
biological processes. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have argued that, despite important differences derived from the change of scale, 
large molecular structures (sometimes, in the form of modules (Raanan et al. 2018)) 
may be either artificially or naturally assembled into an ordered whole, so as to perform 
a potentially useful activity. At the microscopic scale, the building blocks that need to 
be assembled to form the global functional device (i.e. ‘the machine’) are not inert parts, 
but intrinsically-active entities, which either human engineers or cellular machinery 
harness so as to achieve a suitable arrangement. In synthetic bio-engineering, different 
intrinsically-active macromolecular structures are harnessed to (once assembled) 
produce certain desired patterns of activity. Moreover, many of these patterns of activity 
are similar to those of biomolecular motors (myosin, kinesin and dynein) and pumps 
(ATPases), such as myosin, kinesin and dynein. For all these reasons, we conclude that 
scale-related differences do not justify dismissing the status of these devices as 
machines, and that both synthetic and some natural molecular devices can rightly be 
characterised as such since, ultimately, they are functionally-ordered sets of functional 
parts that, together, constrain a flow of energy so as to produce a new, more complex 
and integrated function. Moreover, as in macroscopic machines, in both synthetic and 
biological macromolecular devices, the combination of functional parts to produce new 
ordered wholes results in an open domain of functions. 
However, here is where the specificities of biological macromolecular machines 
emerge. As we have stressed, whereas synthetic molecular machines exhibit a pattern of 
activity that is defined by an external intelligent agent, natural ones define their patterns 
of activity as a result of the organisation of cell’s biochemical network. Since biological 
MMs perform a function by cooperating with many other similar devices within the 
biochemical network of the cell, they either support the maintenance of the global 
cellular organisation or, sooner or later, disappear. As has been pointed out by Arnellos 
and Moreno (2012), the functionality of cellular macromolecules is maintained by a set 
of mutually-dependent functional structures. Moreover, since biological MMs are 
highly vulnerable and constantly need to be supplied with energy, they can be 
maintained only through operations of repair and reproduction (Collier and Hooker 
                                                                                                                                                                          
generated by the complexes of the electron transport chain. When the UCP channel is open, no proton 
flux goes through the F0F1ATPase and, therefore, there is no production of ATP molecules, but rather 
heat production. In this case, the structure of the F0F1ATPase biomolecular machine is maintained, even if 
the machine does not work and performs no function (i.e. the production of ATP molecules). 
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1999). The activity generated by macromolecular structures must be harnessed to 
produce and continuously repair the system in which they are in turn built (Winning and 
Bechtel 2018). Recently, Bechtel (personal communication) has pointed out that one 
crucial difference between synthetic and biological molecular machines is that the 
former display a pattern of activity which becomes functional only through the external 
action of human beings who put them into a socially-defined system, whereas biological 
machines, which are intrinsically autopoietic, become functional by virtue of being 
produced by (and contributing to the maintenance of) a metabolic organisation. 
The reason for this co-dependence between natural molecular machines and the 
cellular metabolic organisation is that, in a natural context, their respective origins can 
only be explained in terms of co-evolution. On the one hand, the functionality of 
biological molecular machines evolved because they were incorporated into a self-
maintaining (SM) system; and on the other, the evolution of the overall dynamics of a 
SM system is intrinsically linked to the increase in structural and functional complexity 
of its biological molecular machines. Although geological or other types of abiotic 
processes played a pivotal role, biological molecular devices only began to perform 
functional activities within SM systems. Moreover, an SM organisation of mutually-
dependent constraints ensured the self-maintenance of biological molecular machines. 
Biological machines are highly precarious and their maintenance depends on the 
maintenance of other cellular mechanisms (i.e. the degradation and replacement of 
proteins). On the one hand, the cell’s biochemical network is maintained by the specific 
contributions of each machine; and on the other, each biological MM is maintained by 
its participation in a largely distributed, far-from-equilibrium network (the set of 
processes and machine activities that constitute the cellular metabolism). The core 
organisation of biological systems (the living cell) is constituted by a host of molecular 
machines that participate reciprocally in their respective processes of fabrication, 
maintenance and operation. We will call this organisation a functional integration of 
macromolecular machines. 
The fact that, as pointed out in section 2, artificial and biological machines are 
embedded, respectively, in a social and in a biological context is at the root of their 
functional complexity: even though each component part of a machine plays a functional 
role in constraining a flow of energy and matter, the systemic function (or mechanism) 
of a machine is something new and not reducible to the singular operations of the parts 
of the machine. The interesting role of machines is that they allow an increase of the 
functional complexity of the organisation where they are produced and to which they 
contribute to maintain. The organized disposition of the components in a meta-stable 
structure produces a new systemic function that is different from the underlying sub-
functional actions of these components. 
Mossio and Moreno (2010) and Moreno and Mossio (2015) have developed the idea 
that the specific causal regime of living systems is a closure of constraints. Ultimately, 
this is an extremely difficult task, since the coordination of a complex set of constraints 
requires regulatory control of the biochemical network of the cell which is established 
by different molecular mechanisms and biological MMs (Bich et al. 2016, Winning and 
Bechtel 2018). Here we have argued that a machine is a complex, functionally-ordered 
set of constraints that together act as a whole, generating a new functional activity. 
In sum, the appearance of machines was of paramount importance in prebiotic and 
biological evolution, because it opened up a new domain of functional diversification: 
new forms of mechanistically-complex functions could be achieved through different 
combinations of parts. Without the concept of machine, we could not understand how 
primitive self-sustaining chemical networks progressively achieved higher degrees of 
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complexity, generating new domains of integrated functions on the basis of an ordered 
combination of functional molecular modules. 
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